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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Philip Milton Ruggiero appeals from the judgment of conviction entered
upon the jury verdicts finding him guilty of three counts of preparing false
evidence. Ruggiero contends the district court erred in two of its evidentiary
rulings.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In Ada County Case No. CR-MD-2011-13936, the state charged Ruggiero
with stalking.1 (See #401752 R., p.80.) In that case, three letters were submitted
to the magistrate that were typewritten and were purportedly from Lisa
Roggenbuck, the victim of the alleged stalking, a “Spearmint Rhino Bouncer,”
and Jenn Higginson. (#40175 R., pp.11-13, 80.) All three letters support the
proposition that Ruggiero was not guilty of the stalking charge alleged in Case
No. CR-MD-2011-13936. (Id.)
Based on the three letters submitted in Case No. CR-MD-2011-13936, the
state charged Ruggiero with three counts of preparing false evidence in violation
of I.C. § 18-2602. (#40175 R., pp.41-43.) Prior to trial, the state filed a notice
pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) indicating its intent to introduce evidence of the stalking
1

According to ICourt Portal, Ruggiero’s stalking case was resolved with Ruggiero
pleading guilty to an amended charge of disturbing the peace.
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Pursuant to the Idaho Supreme Court’s order, the record in this appeal has
been augmented with “the Clerk’s Record, Reporter’s Transcript and the
Magistrate Transcript filed as an Exhibit” from Ruggiero’s prior appeal, State v.
Ruggiero, Docket No. 40175 (Ada County Case No. CR-2012-2301).” (R., p.2.)
The prior appeal resulted in the reversal of the district court’s ruling that I.C. § 182602 violated Ruggiero’s First Amendment rights. State v. Ruggiero, 156 Idaho
662, 330 P.3d 408 (Ct. App. 2014).
1

charge “to provide context of [Ruggiero’s] intent and motive” in relation to
submitting false evidence in that case. (R., pp.40-41.) At the hearing on the
state’s notice, the prosecutor indicated he did not “intend to belabor any of the
underlying facts or circumstances,” but only intended to use the evidence “to
establish the elements of the case.” (6/18/2015 Tr., p.10, L.23 – p.11, L.3.) The
district court stated it was “not even sure” that I.R.E. 404(b) applied because it
was “absolutely essential to the cause of action.” (6/18/2015 Tr., p.10, Ls.18-22;
see also p.11, Ls.6-8 (“[T]here’s utterly no way to avoid this. It’s part of the
charge itself. It is essential.”).) Defense counsel did not file a written response to
the state’s notice, nor did she object to the evidence at the I.R.E. 404(b) hearing.
(See generally R.; 6/18/2015 Tr., pp.10-12.) In fact, when asked at the hearing if
she had any comments, defense counsel responded, “No, Your Honor.”
(6/18/2015 Tr., p.11, Ls.4-5.)

At trial, however, Ruggiero objected to the

admission of evidence regarding the nature of his prior stalking case, and, in the
middle of trial, Ruggiero offered to stipulate that there was a prior proceeding.
(Trial Tr., p.169, Ls.15-19, p.170, L.23 – p.171, L.3.)

The court overruled

Ruggiero’s objection finding the existence of the stalking case was relevant, and
not unduly prejudicial, but agreed that it was unnecessary “to go heavily into the
details.” (Trial Tr., p.169, L.20 – p.170, L.2, p.171, Ls.4-13.)
Ruggiero also objected to the admission of the three letters, claiming the
state failed to lay foundation establishing he was the author of the letters. (Trial.
Tr., p.108, Ls.2-19; see also p.202, Ls.19-21 (motion to strike letters).) The court
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overruled Ruggiero’s objections. (Trial Tr., p.108, L.20 – p.109, L.11; see also
p.202, L.22 – p.203, L.3 (motion to strike denied).)
The jury found Ruggiero guilty of all three counts of preparing false
evidence. (R., pp.93-95.) The court imposed concurrent unified sentences of
five years, with one year fixed, but suspended the sentences and placed
Ruggiero on probation.

(R., pp.106-109.)

appeal. (R., pp.112-114.)

3

Ruggiero filed a timely notice of

ISSUES
Ruggiero states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the trial court err in allowing witnesses for the
prosecution to testify regarding past charges without
performing the required balancing test to determine
relevance and prejudicial effect?

II.

Did the trial court err in admitting letters into evidence
without authentication to support a finding that the letters are
what the state claimed them to be?

(Appellant’s Brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.
To the extent Ruggiero’s evidentiary objections are preserved, has
he failed to show the district court erred in admitting the objected-to testimony
regarding his prior stalking charge?
2.
Has Ruggiero failed to show the district court erred in concluding
the state presented sufficient foundation for the admission of the three false
letters Ruggiero submitted in his stalking case?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
Ruggiero Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Ruling That Limited
Evidence That Ruggiero Was Charged With Stalking In A Previous Case Was
Relevant To Establish The Elements Of Falsifying Evidence In Relation To That
Case
A.

Introduction
Ruggiero contends the admission of “detailed testimony regarding [his]

past stalking charge violated the applicable legal standards required by I.R.E.
404(b).” (Appellant’s Brief, p.5 (bold omitted).) Ruggiero further asserts “the trial
court erred in admitting thorough and persistent testimony of a prior charge, even
though the name and nature of the past offense created a risk of a verdict
influenced by prejudicial considerations.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.6.) Ruggiero’s
arguments fail for at least two reasons. First, to the extent his complaints are not
preserved, this Court should decline to consider them. Second, application of the
correct legal standards to the facts shows the district court did not err in admitting
limited evidence that Ruggiero was previously charged with stalking because
such evidence was necessary to establish the elements of the charged offense of
falsifying evidence. Even if there was error in the admission of the evidence to
which Ruggiero actually objected, any error was harmless.
B.

Standard Of Review
Relevance is a question of law reviewed de novo, while balancing under

I.R.E. 403 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176,
190, 254 P.3d 77, 91 (Ct. App. 2011). Rulings under I.R.E. 404(b) are also
reviewed under a bifurcated standard: whether the evidence is admissible for a
5

purpose other than propensity is given free review while the determination of
whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its
potential for unfair prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

State v.

Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009). In reviewing a trial court’s
discretionary decision, this Court evaluates whether the trial court correctly
perceived the decision as discretionary, whether the trial court acted within the
boundaries of its discretion and consistent with legal standards, and whether the
court exercised reason in making its decision. Norton, 151 Idaho at 190, 254
P.3d at 91.
C.

Ruggiero Has Failed To Establish Error In The Admission Of Any Of The
Evidence Of His Prior Stalking Case To Which He Actually Objected
To be admissible, evidence must be relevant. I.R.E. 401, 402. Evidence

that tends to prove the existence of a fact of consequence in the case, and has
any tendency to make the existence of that fact more probable than it would be
without the evidence, is relevant. State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 544, 547, 768 P.2d
807, 810 (Ct. App. 1989). “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove a defendant’s criminal propensity. However, such evidence
may be admissible for a purpose other than that prohibited by I.R.E. 404(b).”
State v. Truman, 150 Idaho 714, 249 P.3d 1169 (Ct. App. 2011) (citations
omitted). Under I.R.E. 404(b), evidence of prior wrongs or acts may be admitted
to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident. I.R.E. 404(b); State v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 178,
845 P.2d 1211 (1993). “[E]vidence runs afoul of Rule 404(b) only if its purpose is

6

to ‘prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in
conformity therewith.’” State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 190, 254 P.3d 77, 91 (Ct.
App. 2011) (quoting I.R.E. 404(b)).
In order to prove Ruggiero was guilty of falsifying evidence in violation of
I.C. § 18-2602, the state was required to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that Ruggiero (1) “prepared a false paper or instrument in writing”; (2) “with the
intent to produce it or allow it to be produced for any fraudulent or deceitful
purpose as genuine or true, to wit, a false letter”; and (3) “upon any trial,
proceeding or inquiry, authorized by law.” (R., pp.83-85.)3 Thus, the elements of
the offense required the state to present evidence of a “trial, proceeding or
inquiry, authorized by law,” which was Ruggiero’s prior stalking case, as well as
evidence of Ruggiero’s intent in submitting the false letters in that case.
Ruggiero apparently recognized as much given his acquiescence in the state’s
pre-trial I.R.E. 404(b) motion in which the state indicated its intent “to admit
evidence of the underlying criminal charge to provide context [for Ruggiero’s]
intent and motive.” (R., pp.40-41; see generally 6/18/2015 Tr.) Where evidence
of a prior offense is necessary to establish one of the elements of the charged
offense, the evidence is relevant and cannot be subject to exclusion under I.R.E.
404(b).
Notwithstanding his pre-trial acquiescence to the state’s I.R.E. 404(b)
notice, Ruggiero did raise some objections during trial with respect to his prior

3

Because there were three separate false letters purportedly from different
authors (Exhibits 1, 2, 3), there were three separate jury instructions for each
count.
7

stalking case. (See, e.g., Trial Tr., p.99, L.20 – p.100, L.9 (objecting to any
testimony from the prosecutor in the stalking case, claiming she did not “have
anything with regard to the elements of the case”), p.169, Ls.15-19 (objecting to
evidence relating to the nature of the relationship between Ruggiero and the
victim in the stalking case), p.170, L.23 – p.171, L.1 (objecting to testimony from
the victim in the stalking case regarding certain actions taken by Ruggiero).)
However, it is unclear exactly what evidence Ruggiero is complaining of on
appeal since he does not specifically cite any testimony or any particular
objection as part of his I.R.E. 404(b) argument. (See generally Appellant’s Brief,
pp.5-10.) Instead, he generally asserts that “testimony regarding a prior stalking
charge is not relevant to the currently charged offense.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.9.)
Ruggiero did not make such a general objection before or during trial. Rather, he
only objected to specific portions of testimony.

Ruggiero’s general appellate

assertion that no evidence related to his prior stalking charge was relevant or
admissible is not preserved. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.3d
414, 435 (2009) (citation omitted) (“As a general rule, we will not consider
arguments made for the first time on appeal.”); State v. Stevens, 115 Idaho 457,
459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989) (“an objection on one ground will not be
deemed sufficient to preserve for appeal all objections that could have been
raised”).

Moreover, this Court should decline Ruggiero’s implicit invitation to

“search the record on appeal for error.” Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149
Idaho 375, 383, 234 P.3d 699, 707 (2010) (citation omitted). It is Ruggiero’s
burden to show error; it is not the state’s or the Court’s job to look for it on his
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behalf.

Id. (“[T]o the extent that an assignment of error is not argued and

supported in compliance with the I.A.R., it is deemed to be waived.”); Norton, 151
Idaho at 183, 254 P.3d at 84 (“This Court will not pore through a trial transcript
and evaluate each question and answer in order to determine whether there is
objectionable material, let alone add them up and analyze them as a collective
due process violation.”).
Even if this Court elects to examine Ruggiero’s specific trial objections
made in relation to evidence from his stalking case, and the district court’s rulings
thereon, review of those objections and rulings shows no error by the district
court.4

Ruggiero made two specific objections during Lisa Roggenbuck’s

testimony. (Trial Tr., p.169, Ls.17-19, p.170, L.23 – p.171, L.3.) Lisa was the
victim in the stalking case and the purported author of one of the false letters
submitted in that case. (Trial Tr., p.118, L.2 – p.119, L.10, p.122, L.15 – p.123,
L.3; Exhibit 1.)

Lisa testified that she was “one of the entertainers” at the

Spearmint Rhino, which is where she met Ruggiero when he came in as a
customer. (Trial Tr., p.167, L.19 – p.168, L.8.) Lisa described her relationship
with Ruggiero as a “business relationship,” but not a friendship. (Trial Tr., p.169,
Ls.9-14.)

When asked whether the relationship ever changed, or whether

“conduct ever escalate[d],” Ruggiero objected, arguing the prospective evidence

4

The state’s discussion of Ruggiero’s objections does not include his motion to
exclude any testimony from the prosecutor in the stalking case because that
objection was not based on I.R.E. 404(b), nor was it an objection to any particular
testimony by that witness. (Trial Tr., p.99, L.20 – p.100, L.9.) Rather, it was a
general “relevance” objection. (Trial Tr., p.100, Ls.5-9.) Absent any specific
argument by Ruggiero with respect to the prosecutor’s testimony, the state
should not be expected to construct a response.
9

was “prejudicial” and “ha[d] no relevance to anything to do with this case.” (Trial
Tr., p.169, Ls.15-19.) The court overruled the objection, stating:
Well, because the nature of the charge is that there was
preparation of false evidence for a proceeding, then it is relevant
and admissible to discuss that there was a proceeding.
So I will allow counsel to proceed. It is relevant. And I don’t
think it’s unduly prejudicial. It’s something we addressed pretrial.
(Trial Tr., p.169, L.20 – p.170, L.2.)
Ruggiero objected again a few questions later after Lisa testified that she
called law enforcement “on the day that [Ruggiero] told [her] he had [her] license
plate memorized,” recited it to her, and “described the clothes that [she] was
wearing.” (Trial Tr., p.170, Ls.15-22.) In response to that answer, Ruggiero
objected, stated he would “stipulate there was a proceeding” and argued: “We
can’t retry what happened. And this is already trying to turn this into a stalking
case. And, at this point, we’ll stipulate there was a court proceeding or a court
filed [sic].” (Trial Tr., p.170, L.23 – p.171, L.3.) The district court responded:
I don’t think we need to go heavily into the details, Counsel.
So it is relevant that there was a stalking case, because it’s
necessary there be a trial or proceeding. And a stalking case
would be such.
And so I see it is relevant and admissible. And I’m not going
to strike the witness’s response. But I think that it might be useful
to get more directly to the proceeding.
(Trial Tr., p.171, Ls.4-13.) The prosecutor then “move[d] on.” (Trial Tr., p.171,
Ls.14-15.)
On appeal, Ruggiero contends the district court’s admission of evidence of
Ruggiero’s “prior stalking charge” violated I.R.E. 404(b) because the evidence
10

was “not relevant to the currently charged offense,” “the prosecution failed to
establish the past stalking charge as fact,” and “[p]roviding the jury with the name
and details of [his] past stalking charge unfairly prejudiced [him].” (Appellant’s
Brief, pp.7-9, 11.) The most obvious flaw in Ruggiero’s argument on appeal is
that he did not make an I.R.E. 404(b) objection at trial. He only argued the
evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial. “[A]n objection on one ground will not be
deemed sufficient to preserve for appeal all objections that could have been
raised.” Stevens, 115 Idaho at 459, 767 P.2d at 834. An appeal is not the
opportunity for trial counsel to raise objections she did not make at trial.
Ruggiero’s I.R.E. 404(b) complaint in relation to Lisa’s testimony is not
preserved. See State v. Cannady, 137 Idaho 67, 72, 44 P.3d 1122, 1127 (2002)
(“Because [Cannady] did not base his objection upon Rule 404(b) of the Idaho
Rules of Evidence, and such an objection was not apparent from the context,
Cannady has not preserved that issue for appeal.”).

The same is true for

Ruggiero’s complaint that it was unfairly prejudicial to “[p]rovide the jury with the
name” of his stalking charge because Ruggiero never objected to the jury
knowing the name of the offense.
Ruggiero’s argument that the court erred by admitting evidence of his past
stalking charge because “the prosecution failed to establish the past stalking
charge as fact” fails not only because Ruggiero never made an I.R.E. 404(b)
objection, but also because, even if he had, the requirement that a trial court
“make a specific articulation as to whether there is sufficient evidence that the
prior conduct occurred” arises “only if that question is squarely at issue.” State v.
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Marks, 156 Idaho 559, 565, 328 P.3d 539, 545 (Ct. App. 2014) (citation omitted).
The question of whether there was sufficient evidence to establish Ruggiero’s
“prior bad acts as fact” was never “squarely at issue” in this case because
Ruggiero did not challenge the facts underlying the stalking charge. His failure to
do so is consistent with the conclusion that he did not object to the evidence
under I.R.E. 404(b).
With respect to Ruggiero’s prejudice argument, the only objection to
prejudice was in response to the question: “Did the relationship ever change, or
did conduct ever escalate?” (Trial Tr., p.169, Ls.15-19.) Even assuming the
objection to this question was adequate to cover Lisa’s answer two questions
later that Ruggiero “started to think” they “had a relationship together,” and they
“were going to get married,” this testimony was relevant and not unfairly
prejudicial.

The testimony was relevant because it provided the context for

initiating the stalking case, i.e., the proceeding in which Ruggiero submitted the
falsified letters, which was an element of the charged offense in this case. The
testimony was also relevant because it gave context to the statements made in
the falsified letters and was evidence of Ruggiero’s intent in writing the letters.5
(See Trial Tr., p.174, L.4 – p.175, L.6 (Lisa reads false letter purportedly written
by her).)
Lisa’s objected-to testimony would only be subject to exclusion as unfairly
prejudicial if it suggested decision on an improper basis. State v. Floyd, 125

5

The falsified letters were admitted at trial, but are not included in the record on
appeal. (See R., p.130 (Certificate of Exhibits listing only the Presentence
Investigation Report as an exhibit).)
12

Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 908 (Ct. App. 1994). As previously explained by
the Idaho Supreme Court: “Under the rule, the evidence is only excluded if the
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
The rule suggests a strong preference for admissibility of relevant evidence.”
State v. Martin, 118 Idaho 334, 340 n.3, 796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3 (1990)
(emphasis in original). That the evidence of Ruggiero’s prior conduct toward Lisa
was unflattering does not mean it was unfairly prejudicial. See State v. Leavitt,
116 Idaho 285, 290, 775 P.2d 599, 604 (1989) (“Certainly that evidence was
prejudicial to the defendant, however, almost all evidence in a criminal trial is
demonstrably admitted to prove the case of the state, and thus results in
prejudice to a defendant.”). Given the relevance of the evidence, indeed the
necessity of the evidence to satisfy the elements of the charged offense, any
prejudice was not unfair.
Ruggiero attempts to bolster his prejudice argument by claiming that any
prejudice could have been avoided by accepting his willingness to stipulate to the
existence of a prior proceeding.

(Appellant’s Brief, p.12.)

More specifically,

Ruggiero contends the district court “erred by admitting evidence of the past
stalking charge, since [he] repeatedly offered to stipulate to the fact that there
existed a past proceeding; which was an element the prosecution needed to
prove,” and agreed “to stipulate to the only relevant information.” (Appellant’s
Brief, pp.9, 12.)

Contrary to I.A.R. 35(a)(6), Ruggiero does not provide any

citations to the record to support his claims. I.A.R. 35(a)(6) (“The argument shall
contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on
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appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to . . . parts of the transcript and
record relied on.”). The trial transcript reflects that, after his second objection to
Lisa’s testimony, Ruggiero stated, “at this point, we’ll stipulate there was a court
proceeding or a court filed [sic].” (Trial Tr., p.171, Ls.2-3.) It is unclear how this
“offer,” made in the middle of testimony from the fourth state’s witness, reflects a
“repeated” offer to stipulate to the existence of a prior proceeding, or what
“relevant information” Ruggiero believes was included in this offer. It is also
worth noting that, at trial, one of the key themes of Ruggiero’s defense was that
there was no proceeding as contemplated by the elements of preparing false
evidence. (See, e.g., Trial Tr., p.241, L.24 – p.242, L.3 (cautioning the jury not to
“muddle through element No. 5 and pretend like it doesn’t matter”); see R.,
pp.83-85 (element 5 of the jury instructions states “upon any trial, proceeding or
inquiry, authorized by law”).)
Notwithstanding the factual flaws in Ruggiero’s argument that he suffered
prejudice because the court did not allow him to stipulate to the existence of a
prior proceeding, his offer to stipulate has no bearing on whether he was, in fact,
unfairly prejudiced by Lisa’s objected-to testimony.

For the reasons already

stated, he has failed to meet his burden of showing unfair prejudice.

The

Supreme Court’s opinion in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997),
upon which Ruggiero relies, does not change this conclusion. (Appellant’s Brief,
pp.11-12.)
The defendant in Old Chief was charged with violating a federal statute
that prohibited an individual with a prior qualifying conviction from possessing a

14

firearm. 519 U.S. at 174. Old Chief sought to preclude the Government from
introducing evidence of his prior conviction “except to state that [he] had been
convicted of” a qualifying offense. Id. (emphasis omitted). Old Chief offered to
“stipulate to the fact of the prior conviction” and argued that, by doing so, “the
name and nature of the offense [was] inadmissible under Rule 403 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the danger being that the unfair prejudice from that evidence
would substantially outweigh its probative value.” Id. at 175. With respect to the
evidentiary issues presented in relation to evidence of Old Chief’s prior
conviction, the Supreme Court held that “[a] documentary record of the
conviction” was relevant because it made Old Chief’s status under the charged
offense “more probable than it would have been without the evidence.” Id. at
179. Addressing the prejudice prong of the evidentiary analysis under F.R.E.
403, the Court noted that the “prior-conviction element” of the charged offense
“generally carries a risk of unfair prejudice,” but “[t]hat risk will vary from case to
case,” depending on the nature of the prior conviction relative to the nature of the
defendant’s pending charges. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 186. The Court also noted
that a party’s willingness to concede an element is “pertinent to the court’s
discretion to exclude evidence on the point conceded.” Id. at 184. Weighing the
potential prejudice associated with admitting evidence of the name and nature of
Old Chief’s prior conviction against Old Chief’s willingness to stipulate to the fact
of conviction, the Court found there was “no cognizable difference between the
evidentiary significance of an admission and of the legitimately probative
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component of the official record the prosecution would prefer to place in
evidence.” Id. at 191. The Court concluded:
For purposes of the Rule 403 weighing of the probative against the
prejudicial, the functions of the competing evidence are
distinguishable only by the risk inherent in the one and wholly
absent from the other. In this case, as in any other in which the
prior conviction is for an offense likely to support conviction on
some improper ground, the only reasonable conclusion was that
the risk of unfair prejudice did substantially outweigh the discounted
probative value of the record of conviction, and it was an abuse of
discretion to admit the record when an admission was available.
What we have said shows why this will be the general rule when
proof of convict status is at issue, just as the prosecutor’s choice
will generally survive a Rule 403 analysis when a defendant seeks
to force the substitution of an admission for evidence creating a
coherent narrative of his thoughts and actions in perpetrating the
offense for which he is being tried.
Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 191-192.
The only “general rule” supported by Old Chief is that, when the existence
of a prior conviction is an element of a charged offense, the record of the prior
conviction should be excluded if the defendant is willing to stipulate to the
existence of the conviction. Id. Otherwise, Old Chief endorses balancing the
probative value of evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice when
responding to an objection under Rule 403, which is what the district court did in
this case when Ruggiero made an objection based on prejudice. As previously
noted, the district court correctly balanced the probative value against the danger
of unfair prejudice. Ruggiero’s eventual offer to stipulate to the fact of the prior
proceeding did not change the balance given the timing of his offer to do so,
which was after the jury had already been apprised, through other witnesses, of
the existence of a prior stalking case. Forcing the state to accept the stipulation
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at the time it was offered, instead of allowing the state to tell it’s “story,” which is
a legitimate consideration under Old Chief, would have also created confusion
given Ruggiero’s efforts to establish, through an earlier witness, that there was
no proceeding. (Trial Tr., p.149, L.14 – p.150, L.25.) Avoiding confusion is also
a relevant consideration when balancing the admissibility of evidence under Rule
403. Moreover, any stipulation to the existence of the prior proceeding would
have been ineffective in addressing the relevance of the limited factual basis for
the stalking charge, which was to show that the content of the letters was false
and to show Ruggiero’s intent in writing the letters. Ruggiero’s reliance on Old
Chief to support his prejudice argument is unpersuasive.
In his final argument regarding prejudice, Ruggiero asserts the district
court “abused its discretion when it failed to conduct a balancing test to
determine whether the evidence of [his] past stalking charge had a prejudicial
effect that outweighed its probative value.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.14.) For the first
time, Ruggiero actually directs the Court to the objection that led to the ruling he
challenges.

(Appellant’s Brief, p.14 (citing Trial Tr., p.169, Ls.20-23).)

The

objection was the first one he made during Lisa’s testimony when she was asked
whether her relationship with him ever escalated. (Trial Tr., p.169, Ls.15-19.)
The objection was “prejudicial” and “no relevance.” (Id.) The court responded to
this objection as follows:
Well, because the nature of the charge is that there was
preparation of false evidence for a proceeding, then it is relevant
and admissible to discuss that there was a proceeding.
So I will allow counsel to proceed. It is relevant. And I don’t
think it’s unduly prejudicial. It’s something we addressed pretrial.
17

(Trial Tr., p.169, L.20 – p.170, L.2.)
On appeal, Ruggiero quotes the first paragraph of the court’s ruling, but
not the second paragraph in which the court specially states: “I don’t think it’s
unduly prejudicial.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.14.) Instead, Ruggiero argues that the
district court “simply” found the evidence relevant without balancing the evidence
under I.R.E. 403.

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.13-14.)

Ruggiero either ignores the

district court’s specific ruling regarding prejudice because it directly contradicts
his claim, or he failed to read the entirety of the court’s ruling. Either way, his
argument that the district court failed to conduct an I.R.E. 403 analysis is
contradicted by the record.
To the extent his evidentiary claims are preserved, Ruggiero has failed to
show any error in the admission of Lisa’s testimony.
D.

Even If This Court Concludes Ruggiero Has Met His Burden Of Showing
Evidentiary Error, Any Such Error Is Harmless
Even if this Court concludes that any of Lisa’s objected-to testimony

should have been excluded, the error is harmless.

Idaho Criminal Rule 52

provides that “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect
substantial rights shall be disregarded.”

I.C.R. 52.

The relevant inquiry “is

whether the complained-of error contributed to the verdict, or whether it was
unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered.” State v. Neyhart,
160 Idaho 748, ---, 378 P.3d 1045, 1055 (Ct. App. 2016).
Lisa’s

objected-to

testimony

related

limited

information

regarding

Ruggiero’s conduct that resulted in the underlying criminal proceeding in which
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Ruggiero submitted false evidence. When considered in relation to all the other
evidence the jury considered, this Court can easily conclude that Lisa’s objectedto testimony did not contribute to the verdict.
Christine Starr testified that a falsified letter was submitted in relation to a
stalking case against Ruggiero in which Lisa was the victim. (Trial Tr., p.118, L.2
– p.119, L.10, p.120, Ls.5-13.)
The Honorable Thomas Watkins, who presided over the stalking case,
also testified that he received the letters in relation to a second-degree stalking
case against Ruggiero. (Trial Tr., p.135, L.22 – p.136, L.9, p.138, L.23 – p.139,
L.8.)
Kristy Wood, Ruggiero’s ex-wife, testified that, during the time the letters
were sent, she saw Ruggiero typing documents at home on his typewriter, and
she specifically saw the letter that was purportedly written by Lisa (Exhibit 1).
(Trial Tr., p.157, L.10 – p.158, L.24, p.159, L.21 – p.160, L.4.)

Kristy also

testified that she took Ruggiero, at his request, to buy perfume to spray on one of
the letters, and she witnessed him spraying the letter purportedly written by Lisa.
(Trial Tr., p.159, L.3 – p.160, L.10.) Ruggiero told Kristy he sprayed the letters
“[s]o that it would smell like a female.” (Trial Tr., p.164, Ls.2-11.)
Lisa also testified, without objection, that she did not write the letter
purportedly authored by her, the contents of the letter were generally false, and
the letter referred to certain behavior by Ruggiero. (Trial Tr., p.172, L.14 - p.176,
L.17.)
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Finally, Detective Angela Munson testified that Ruggiero ultimately
acknowledged that he wrote the letters in order to “get out of trouble.” (Trial Tr.,
p.187, L.20 – p.188, L.11.)
That the jury received a limited amount of detail regarding the nature of
the conduct underlying the stalking charge did not, in light of the other evidence
presented, contribute to the jury’s verdict that Ruggiero submitted false letters in
the stalking proceeding.
II.
Ruggiero Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Overruling His Foundation Objections To The False Letters
A.

Introduction
Ruggiero contends that the district court abused its discretion in overruling

his foundation objections to the admission of the false letters that formed the
factual basis of the three preparing false evidence charges. (Appellant’s Brief,
pp.14-16.) Ruggiero’s argument fails because the record reveals that the state
satisfied the evidentiary foundation requirements for admission of the three
letters.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Whether there is proper foundation upon which to admit evidence is a

matter within the trial court’s discretion.” State v. Koch, 157 Idaho 89, 96, 334
P.3d 280, 287 (2014) (citation omitted).
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C.

The State Presented Adequate Foundation For The Admission Of The
Three Fake Letters
Foundation for evidence is governed by Idaho Rule of Evidence 901,

which provides: The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. I.R.E. 901(a). “By way
of illustration,” but “not by way of limitation,” the rule provides that the foundation
requirements can be met through “[t]estimony of a witness with knowledge that a
matter is what it is claimed to be,” I.R.E. 901(b)(1), and when there exists
“distinctive characteristics,” such as “[a]ppearance, contents, substance, [or]
internal patterns . . ., taken in conjunction with circumstances,” I.R.E. 901(b)(4).
“[C]ircumstantial evidence establishing that the evidence was what the proponent
claimed” is sufficient for purposes of foundation under I.R.E. 901. State v. Koch,
157 Idaho 89, 96, 334 P.3d 280, 287 (2014) (citing cases); State v. Silverson,
130 Idaho 283, 285, 939 P.2d 859, 861 (Ct. App. 1997) (“[W]ritten and signed
documents, like any other type of evidence, may be authenticated through any
means ‘which is sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what
its proponent claims.’ I.R.E. 901(a). This may include authentication through
circumstantial evidence.”).
Prior to trial, Ruggiero moved to exclude Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, the three
false letters, arguing that he “didn’t believe that the State would be able to
authenticate th[e] letters.” (Trial Tr., p.108, Ls.3-6; see also p.108, Ls.18-19 (“I
don’t think they can authenticate them.”).) The district court declined Ruggiero’s
in limine request, correctly concluding that the state would have the opportunity
21

to lay the foundation at trial. (Trial Tr., p.108, L.20 – p.109, L.11.) During trial,
the court admitted the letters “subject to being stricken” absent further
foundation. (Trial Tr., p.141, L.18 – p.142, L.9.) At the conclusion of the trial, the
district court concluded there was adequate foundation for admission of the
letters “without limitation.” (Trial Tr., p.202, L.22 – p.203, L.3.)
Ruggiero contends the false letters “lacked proper foundation and were
erroneously admitted into evidence” because the false letters “did not contain a
signature,” and were not “created under an official duty to maintain records of
service.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.16.) Ruggiero further argues the “state failed to
offer convincing enough circumstantial evidence to substantiate the claim the
letters were actually written by [him] and properly authenticated under I.R.E.
901.”

(Appellant’s Brief, p.16.)

Ruggiero’s arguments fail for at least two

reasons.
First, adequate foundation for the letters did not require a “signature” or
evidence that the letters were “created under an official duty to maintain records
of service.” While such evidence would be proper foundation, I.R.E. 901 does
not require such evidence in order to lay foundation. Indeed, the rule expressly
states that, even the “examples of authentication or identification conforming with
the requirements of th[e] rule” set forth in I.R.E. 901(b)(1)-(10), are only
illustrative and not exclusive. I.R.E. 901(b); Koch, 157 Idaho at 96, 334 P.3d at
287 (“Rule 901(b) contains an illustrative, but not exhaustive, list of suggested
methods of identification.”).
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Second, the test for adequate foundation based on circumstantial
evidence is not whether it was “convincing enough.” The test is whether the
evidence is “sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its
proponent claims.” I.R.E. 901(a). That standard was satisfied in this case. The
proponent of the letters – the state – claimed the letters were submitted to the
judge in Ruggiero’s stalking case and provided evidence to that effect. The
evidence supporting the foundation for that claim included Christine Starr’s
testimony that she received Exhibit 1 in the context of Ruggiero’s stalking case
(Trial Tr., p.119, L.17 – p.120, L.25), and Judge Watkins’ testimony that he
received Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 in relation to Ruggiero’s stalking case (Trial Tr.,
p.135, L.22 – p.136, L.9, p.138, L.23 – p.139, L.8).

That was all that was

required in order to lay foundation for admission of the three letters. Although the
state was required to prove that Ruggiero submitted the letters, and that the
letters were false, in order to prove Ruggiero was guilty of the charged offenses
(R., pp.83-85), such evidence was not required as part of the foundation for
admission of the letters. Ruggiero’s claim to the contrary fails.
Even if the state was required to establish, as a component of foundation,
that Ruggiero was the author of the letters, that standard was also satisfied.
Kristy Woody testified that Ruggiero owned a typewriter, she saw him typing
documents during the relevant time period, she specifically saw the letter
admitted as Exhibit 1, which purported to be from Lisa, and she saw Ruggiero
spray perfume on it so it would “smell like a female.” (Trial Tr., p.156, L.2 –
p.160, L.4, p.164, Ls.2-11.) Lisa testified that the contents of Exhibit 1 were
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factually false, and that she did not author Exhibit 1. (Trial Tr., p.172, L.14 –
p.176, L.21.) Finally, Detective Munson testified that Ruggiero acknowledged
that he wrote the letters in an effort to “get out of trouble.” (Trial Tr., p.187, L.24
– p.188, L.11.) Detective Munson also noted the similarities between the letters,
which made her suspect all three letters “were written by the same person.”
(Trial Tr., p.182, L.8 – p.183, L.23.)

Those similarities included the same

“general letter writing format,” they all “had the case number at the top of the
letter,” “there were misspellings on all three of them,” “none of them had
signatures or handwritten signatures at the bottom,” “they were all written around
the same timeframe,” and “they were all addressed to Judge Watkins.” (Trial Tr.,
p.183, L.24 – p.184, L.11.)

In other words, all three letters had “distinctive

characteristics” indicating they were written by the same author (Ruggiero), for
the same purpose (to improperly influence the resolution of his stalking case).
The district court correctly concluded that this evidence was more than adequate
to support the foundational prerequisite that Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 were what the
state claimed, i.e., false letters submitted by Ruggiero in his stalking case.6
Compare Koch, 157 Idaho at 97-99, 334 P.3d at 288-290 (recognizing that
content may be considered in assessing foundation); State v. Chacon, 145 Idaho
814, 817, 186 P.3d 670, 673 (Ct. App. 2008) (“The Idaho Rules of Evidence d[o]
6

To the extent the actual letters are necessary to consider whether there was
adequate foundation for their admission, as noted, the letters themselves are not
included in the record on appeal. (See R., p.130.) The “appellant bears the
burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can review
the merits of the claims of error, and where pertinent portions of the record are
missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court.”
State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34, 981 P.2d 754, 759 (Ct. App. 1999) (citations
omitted).
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not require the state to present expert testimony or forensic evidence
establishing that [a particular individual] authored [a document] in order to
properly authenticate [it].”).
Ruggiero has failed to meet his burden of showing the district court erred
in admitting Exhibits 1, 2, and 3.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon the jury verdict finding Ruggiero guilty of three counts of preparing false
evidence.
DATED this 26th day of October, 2016.

_/s/ Jessica M. Lorello______
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Deputy Attorney General
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